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Notes from the Field:
Monitoring Human Rights Trials: Information Strategies
Developed in Argentina’s Transitional Justice Process
Lorena Balardini, University of Buenos Aires
lbalardini@derecho.uba.ar
Abstract
Although the role of local Human Rights Organizations (HROs) has
attracted some attention in the transitional justice literature, this note
from the field examines an under-studied HRO strategy: the
production and systematization of information. In particular, it focuses
on the Center for Legal and Social Studies’ (CELS) efforts to promote
accountability for the gross human rights violations committed during
Argentina’s last period of military rule (1976–1983). It argues that the
production and systematization of information is foundational for
transitional justice advocacy, and CELS’ work has influenced
Argentina’s transitional justice processes and the broader struggle for
accountability. The main focus of the note is the use of information
for post-transition legal accountability, the purpose of which is to set
judging standards and point out difficulties in prosecuting systematic
human rights violations. This is addressed by describing a specific
information strategy implemented by CELS. This information deals
with the status of trials for past human rights violations ongoing
throughout Argentina.
Introduction
Argentina’s transitional justice experience for the gross human rights
violations committed during its last period of military rule (1976–83)
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 233-261
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has been extensively explored by scholars and has often been
considered “exceptional” for several reasons. First, Argentina is the
only country in Latin America, and one of the few in the world, where
military high commanders were prosecuted early in the transition. 1
Second, in the three decades following the transition, the country has
implemented what can be considered “a full menu” of transitional
justice mechanisms: a truth commission, restitution of rights,
reparations, criminal and ‘truth’ trials, and lustration.2
To explain the existence of such a remarkable transitional
justice approach, scholars have often referred to the important role of
local human rights organizations (HROs), and have studied their
political actions, such as denunciations and mobilization both

See, among others, Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996) and Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, ¡Ni olvido ni perdón? Derechos
Humanos y tensiones cívico-militares en la transición argentina (Buenos Aires: Centro de
Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1991).
2 Catalina Smulovitz, “The Past Is Never Dead: Accountability and Justice for Past
Human Rights Violations in Argentina” in Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano,
eds., After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2012).
1
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domestically and transnationally. 3 They also have employed legal
strategies, lodging cases in local and regional courts.4
This note from the field analyzes a different strategy
implemented by Argentine HROs, namely the production and
systematization of information. This underappreciated activity is
foundational, and has influenced Argentina’s transitional justice
process and the broader struggle for accountability. Although the
production of information is a central element of transitional justice
processes, it has not received adequate attention. Existing studies focus
on how HROs use information to create awareness and to publicly

For only a partial list of this literature, see Acuña and Smulovitz 1991; Alison Brysk,
“From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human
Rights in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 26.3 (1993): 259-85; Alison Brysk,
The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994); Alyson Brisk, “The Politics of Measurement:
Counting the Disappeared in Argentina,” Human Rights Quarterly 16.4 (1994) 676-92;
Alison Brysk, ed., Globalization and Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002); Elizabeth Jelin, “La política de la memoria: el movimiento de derechos
humanos y la construcción democrática en la Argentina” in Carlos Acuña et al., eds.,
Juicios, castigos y memorias. Derechos humanos y justicia en la política argentina (Buenos Aires:
Editores Nueva Visión, 1995); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press,
1998).
4 See, for example, Jo-Marie Burt, “The New Accountability Agenda in Latin
America: The Promise and Perils of Human Rights Prosecutions” in Katherine Hite
and Mark Ungar, eds., Sustaining Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: Strategies from
Latin America (Washington DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and
the John Hopkins University Press, 2012); Cath Collins, Post-Transitional Justice:
Human Rights in Chile and El Salvador (University Park: Penn State University Press,
2010); Par Engstrom and Gabriel Pereira, “From Amnesty to Accountability: The
Ebb and Flow in the Search for Justice in Argentina,” in Francesca Lessa and Leigh
Payne, eds., Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and
International Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kathryn
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2011).
3
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denounce the crimes to obtain condemnation.5 Yet few studies analyze
the way HROs use it to achieve accountability.
Here, I focus on HROs’ data-collection strategies, considered
in the context of cooperation and tension between them and state
agencies. I argue that data collection first and systematization
afterwards were both crucial information strategies in the struggle for
the recognition of human rights offences and for them to be
considered in the framework of transitional justice mechanisms. In
addition, implementing such strategies led to the emergence of an
“information policy” that has been an important contribution of the
HROs to the transitional justice process. In particular, it allowed
human rights violations to be publicly recognized, and to turn them
into criminal cases.
Moreover, this note focuses on the uses of information for
post-transition legal accountability, the purpose of which is to set judicial
standards and point out gaps and difficulties in prosecuting gross
human rights violations. This is addressed by describing a specific
information strategy implemented by one HRO: the Center for Legal
and Social Studies (CELS for its Spanish acronym). The information
produced by CELS deals with the status of trials for past human rights
violations ongoing throughout the country. This information strategy
corresponds to the current stage of the transitional justice process in
Argentina, which the literature has characterized as “post-transition”
or “late justice.”6 Its antecedent is information on crimes, victims, and
See Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”; Shayne Weyker, “The Ironies of
Information Technology” in Alison Brysk ed., Globalization and Human Rights
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); Richard Claude and
Thomas Jabine, “Exploring Human Rights Issues with Statistics” in Richard Claude
and Thomas Jabine, eds., Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).
6 Post-transitional justice focuses on the continued legal pursuit of justice for past
human rights violations in order to dismantle amnesty provisions that prevented
criminal judgment. See Collins 2010: 2-3. Among the external phenomena that
influenced this process is progress in international human rights law; for further
5
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perpetrators produced by HROs during the dictatorship and the
transition.
Information Strategies in Transitional Justice Processes
This note’s focus is on a particular kind of information, which has been
systematized through a series of operations. Michel Foucault defined
systematization as a technique for the standardization of records that
enables correlating different elements of a phenomenon elaborating
series and patterns, and setting standards. He attributes decisive
importance in this process to the so-called “small techniques” of
notation, registration, and creation of records. Such documentary
techniques allow the creation of a “case,” a set of circumstances that
qualify as facts.7 This note presents a thorough description of these
“small techniques” deployed by Argentine HROs in the post-transition
period.

detail see Leonardo Filippini, “Criminal Prosecution in the Search for Justice,” in
CELS and ICTJ, eds., Making Justice: Further Discussions on the Prosecution of Crimes against
Humanity in Argentina (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2011). Other external
phenomena include the “Pinochet effect,” which refers to the impact of the
detention of Chilean ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998 in London, and the cases
filed overseas against Argentine military personnel based upon universal jurisdiction.
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human
Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) and Lorena Balardini, “Argentina: the
Regional Protagonist,” in Elin Skaar, Cath Collins and Jemima Garcia-Godos, eds.,
Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven Road from Impunity towards Accountability
(London: Routledge, forthcoming). In this note, I consider Argentina’s posttransitional justice period to start with the first judicial decision declaring the amnesty
laws unconstitutional in 2001 in the landmark “Simón” case filed by CELS and
Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo. The Supreme Court completely dismantled the
juridical effects of amnesty through its final 2005 ruling in the case. See CELS,
“Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2008,” (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI
Editores, 2008): 51.
7 Michel Foucault, Vigilar y castigar. Nacimiento de la prisión. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI
Editores, 1976): 195-96.
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The institutional frame for the deployment of these techniques
is either an authoritarian regime that systematically violates human
rights or a democratic government during transition/post-transition
that faces serious challenges, among them the production of reliable
information on past crimes and/or on its own transitional justice
policies. NGOs demand tools, methodologies, and specific inputs to
monitor state actions and policies. Following Laura Pautassi,
incorporating new and better instruments for the measurement of
rights constitutes a useful tool for the processes of evaluation and
supervision of state human rights obligations.8 Damián Loreti and Luis
Lozano argue that the “right to information” involves positive state
obligations, as it must remove any obstacles for access to produce,
preserve, and disseminate information. They highlight that
information relating to gross human rights violations should be
available for interested parties.9 Following Valeria Barbuto, this note
reflects upon the production of information on human rights
violations as a territory of networking alliances as well as tensions and
disputes.10
The information strategies implemented by Argentine HROs
were sustained in exchanges and learning within the framework of
transnational advocacy networks. Exchanges between these networks’
members consist of a “dense flow of information and services.”11 This
Laura Pautassi “Indicadores en materia de derechos económicos, sociales y
culturales. Más allá de la medición” in Víctor Abramovich and Laura Pautassi, eds.,
La medición de derechos en las políticas sociales (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Puerto, 2010):
5.
9 Damián Loreti and Luis Lozano, El derecho a comunicar. Los conflictos en torno a la libertad
de expresión en las sociedades contemporáneas (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2014):
253.
10 Valeria Barbuto “Reflexiones sobre los procesos de documentación de la violencia
estatal como estrategia de intervención política y jurídica,” paper presented at the
VIII Meeting of Mercosur Anthropology (Buenos Aires, 2009): 14.
11 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Human
Rights Network in Latin America,” in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds.,
8
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occurs through exchanges of reports, which are intended to influence,
using international partnerships, domestic politics. This is what
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have called the boomerang pattern,
in which local organizations generate a change in the policy of their
own state by working with international partners who exert pressure.
These authors developed a typology of tactics that networks use in
their efforts to persuade society; among them there are information
politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable
information and move it where it has more impact.12
As part of these networks, HROs’ role in information politics
is crucial. They serve as alternative sources of information, especially
when a state is charged in the public sphere with systematic human
rights violations. 13 Human Rights Information and Documentation
Systems (HURIDOCS) has argued that information is essential for the
protection and promotion of human rights:
There is need to promote the work of documentation,
organization and classification of data; this way, essential
elements to make decisions promptly are provided.
Documentation must be oriented to action, to the needs of its
users. This work involves increasing access to sources of
information, adopting modern classification systems that take
the advances of computer science and establishing expedited
channels to disseminate the information.14
Information flows in these networks include claims and
testimonies of crimes. HROs’ emphasis on collecting testimonies that
Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996): 73.
12 Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13, 16.
13 Ibid., 19.
14HURIDOCS, “Encuesta sobre la Disponibilidad de información y documentación
de derechos humanos en América Latina y el Caribe” (Roma: 1983): 110.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 233-261
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document repression serve a legal function and promote an
interpretation of what happened during illegal repression. Testimonies
help to establish a pattern of state responsibility, strengthening HROs’
claim for accountability.15 As part of information politics, activists who
use testimonies frame them simply, because their purpose is to
persuade people and stimulate them to act. When the purpose is to
build a case to obtain legal accountability, however, Keck and Sikkink
caution that there are several layers of prior mediation/translation
performed on the information. Systematization is the tool for this.
However, they argue that HROs legitimize the use of information from
testimonies, supplementing it with technical and statistical
information: what they consider “a two-level approach” as part of the
effort to make a more precise description of the facts. 16 Dorothy
Thomas has described this as “human rights methodology,” which is
based on producing credible, well-documented information to
promote change.17 “The message matters,” says Alison Brysk.18 HROs’
ability to succeed in their accountability goals is related to the content
of the complaints. In terms of the information they produce, Argentine
HROs provide coherence and credibility. The “internationalization” of
their information contributed to the construction of this credibility and
somehow also to the protection of organizations during the
authoritarian period.
Shayne Weyker claims that “well-researched, professionally
presented, truthful and factual information, turned out quickly enough
to be passed on to the right people at the right time” produces results
for HROs. 19 They use factual information to reach international
audiences and challenge local institutions. Brysk argues that, as long as
Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”: 14-15.
Keck and Sikkink 1998: 19.
17 Dorothy Thomas, “Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure,” in
Joanna Kerr ed., Ours by Right: Women’s Rights as Human Rights (London: Zed Books,
1993): 83.
18 Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”: 13.
19 Weyker 2002: 116-17.
15
16
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the state cannot monopolize information and legitimacy, organizations
and social movements gain power by projecting “cognitive and
affective” information to form international alliances. This distinction
between two types of information can be useful to understand the
production of information by HROs in Argentina. It allows glimpsing
an informal “division of labor” between different organizations around
the production of information between: a) Information as “political
theater”: affective information to create public awareness of the
crimes; and b) “Documentation”: cognitive information that gives an
understanding of the extension, details, and mechanics of the problem,
needed to take policy decisions. 20
Examples of the first type of information are the strategies
deployed by relatives’ organizations. They issue press reports and
articles in national and international media and letters to well-known
actors in politics, religion, and culture to denounce crimes. This type
of information strategy seeks to create an emotional impact by
appealing to symbols and resources linked to the affection and the
impact of repression in families.21 The information that can be framed
in Brysk’s “cognitive” category is the type on which this note will focus
because it corresponds to the monitoring and systematization
strategies. Systematization contributes to the identification of
repressive patterns, which are crucial for the construction of criminal
cases.
However, it is important to add two other key elements. First,
Weyker’s concept of “computerization” is important. Information lies
at the heart of what HROs do, and technological advances allow them
to manage it more effectively. The first real strength of information
technology for HROs is that computers improve the ability to marshal
facts (cognitive information) on their side into a persuasive, logical
argument. Information technology speeds up, enlarges the scale, and
Brysk 1993: 264.
This type of information has been collected from the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo’s
historical archive.
20
21
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improves the quality of information collection and processing by
HROs. 22 The novelty of the computer in the history of these
techniques is that it facilitates the exteriorization of human beings’
mental faculties for information processing. 23 A final important
element is the production of statistics. Richard Claude and Thomas
Jabine argue that those who work in the human rights field know that
fixing the responsibility for violations requires an assessment of how,
how much, and why human freedoms are in danger. Regarding human
rights data, statistics can make the difference. They intend to “set the
record straight,” which is of primary importance in the human rights
field. These authors bring an interesting approach; they believe that
HRO/NGO reports do not always provide systematic or
comprehensive data. However, they point out that they provide
monitoring. 24 Human rights monitoring is able to track changes in
policy when there are quantifiable standards by which to present the
data.
Information and Transitional Justice in Argentina
The systematic repression perpetrated during the last dictatorship in
Argentina established a complex social environment in which several
HROs were active. Some of these groups existed before the conflict
emerged; others were formed by families during the escalation of
violence. This way, the fight for human rights became an important
social movement.25 CELS has played a critical role in HROs’ posttransitional information strategies. It was created in mid-1979 by a
group of parents of disappeared people. However, the organization did
Weyker 2002: 115-18.
Alain Supiot, Homo juridicus. Ensayo sobre la función antropológica del derecho (Buenos
Aires: Siglo XXI editors, 2007): 170.
24 Claude and Jabine 1991: 5-7,16.
25 See, among the extensive literature that covers this subject, Ludmila Da Silva
Catela, No habrá flores en las tumbas del pasado. La experiencia de reconstrucción del mundo de
los familiares de desaparecidos. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Al Margen, 2001): 65-66; Jelin
1995: 105; Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: 45-49.
22
23
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not base its identity on this condition, but rather on its professionalism
and its founders’ legal background. It also sought to reproduce the
pragmatic and professional manner of international entities, especially
regarding its work with information. According to CELS, “a testimony
or complaint was not enough; systematic documentation work was
needed with permanent contact with these international institutions to
be able to call attention to the serious violations to human rights that
were being carried out in Argentina.”26
CELS and other Argentine HROs have been pioneers in the
use of information strategies. They have designed tools ranging from
the simplest or “artisanal” to the most methodologically sophisticated
in order to produce reliable data supportive of their demands for
accountability. The dictatorship had kidnapped, tortured, murdered,
and disappeared its political opponents. Legal accountability for these
crimes was a primary objective during and after the transition. Here, it
is important to highlight that the legal field and the set of rules
established by it are an important influence on the strategies designed
by HROs in the pursuit of accountability.27 Legal professionals also
had a clear influence on CELS’ strategies analyzed here.
HROs’ systematization strategies have evolved over time.
During military rule, in the context of the 1979 visit of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to the country,
HROs emphasized the production of repressive patterns that reflected
regularities in the cases. It was the first effort to move from the
Comisión Provincial de la Memoria, Historia de Organismos de Derechos Humanos - 25
años de Resistencia. Dossier 4: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Buenos Aires:
No Date).
27 Pierre Bourdieu defines the juridical field as “the site of a competition for
monopoly of the right to determine the law. Within this field there occurs a
confrontation among actors possessing a technical competence which is inevitably
social and which consists essentially in the socially recognized capacity to interpret a
corpus of texts sanctifying a correct or legitimized vision of the social world.” See
Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field,”
Hastings Law Journal 38 (1987): 805-53.
26
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documentation and gathering of information to the systematization of
testimonies, even before the possibility of using technological tools.
All these elements were included in a “secret” report that the
organizations delivered to the IACHR.28 During the transition, building
legal cases to be brought to the courts, and the search for the truth drove the
strategy. In 1983, HROs formed the “Technical Commission for Data
Collection” to pool all the information from their archives and to put
together cases in a complete fashion in order to deliver all the
information to the newly elected government. Settling a legal case
implies defining the circumstances of the repressive act, as well as
identifying possible perpetrators. The database of the Technical
Commission was ahead of its time because it provided the unique
opportunity to relate repressive acts with responsible parties and locate
them within the military chain of command. The commission prepared
a report for the newly-elected Congress and shared the database with
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons’ (Spanish
acronym CONADEP) Documentation and Data Processing unit. 29
After the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws put a halt to criminal
cases, HROs produced statistics on “people no longer prosecuted” to highlight
the injustice of amnesty and to hopefully rejuvenate the criminal justice
process. 30 During the post-transition phase, there were changes in
information strategies. After the reopening of criminal cases for
Unfortunately, all the copies are lost; research was based on a draft found in CELS’
archives and in an interview with the only living person who was involved. Author
interview with Noemi Labrune, president of Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos
Humanos (APDH) Neuquén and former member of CELS, 29 January 2014. All
author interviews were conducted in Buenos Aires.
29 The report was delivered on 2 August 1984. A draft of the report was also found
in CELS’ archives. Author interviews with Rafael Mazzella, computer expert from
the Technical Commission, 28 March 2014 and with Daniel Salvador, secretary of
Documentation and Data Processing from CONADEP, 26 November 2014.
30 This was published in the booklet “Guilty for society, unpunished by the law” in
1988. The perpetrators are not referred to as “acquitted” or “amnestied” but as “no
longer being prosecuted” (desprocesados, in Spanish), as a sign of protest.
28
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dictatorship-era human rights violations, HROs focused on bringing
cases to courts throughout the country. The cases were based upon
information produced in the framework of transitional justice
mechanisms during the transition. This way, during the post-transition
period, HROs focused on the production of monitoring information,
as will be described next.
“Measuring Justice”: Databases for Monitoring Human Rights
Trials
This section focuses on CELS’ human rights trials monitoring. During
the transition, CELS reinforced its international position, not only in
the search for solidarity as during the conflict, but also through the
search for funds. Access to economic resources allowed it to form paid
technical teams early in the transition, which distinguishes it from
other HROs that had serious financial problems.31 Today, it is one of
the most professionalized Argentine HROs and is identified as “the
technical arm of the human rights movement.”32 This condition has
allowed it to become an important player during discussions by
relevant state actors.
The implementation of the monitoring strategy cannot be
understood as a linear process. The needs of information and the
accountability purposes have changed since 2001 and this has
influenced not only the methodologies but also the “uses” of the
information produced. Three types of information use can be
identified in the post-transition period:

“At the beginning of transition we started to have financial problems. Most donors
had withdrawn their help; we never had enough money and survived out of
volunteers.” Author interview with Bella Frizman, vice-president of APDH, 12
November 2014.
32 Author interview with Noemi Labrune. This aspect was also mentioned in
interviews with Bella Frizman and Estela de Carlotto, president of Grandmothers of
Plaza de Mayo, 17 February 2014.
31
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1) Information to legitimate the trials, at the very
beginning of the process (2001-2006);
2) Information to set legal standards, when criminal
investigations were finally active (2007-2008); and
3) Information to identify gaps in the judicial framework
for trying these cases and support state agencies in
charge of the trials (2009-today).
Each is discussed in more detail below.
Information to Legitimate the Trials (2001-2006)
CELS began to gather information on the criminal cases for the
dictatorship-era human rights offences after the first ruling in the
“Simón” case in 2001. Victor Abramovich, former CELS executive
director, remembers that there was a general sensation within the
government that the trials were as “destabilizing” as during the
transition. Against this backdrop, CELS recognized the necessity of
producing information to grant the effort legitimacy, as part of the
accountability process. As Abramovich noted:
During the year 2002 began the discussion about the reopening
of the trials. Government was concerned they were going to
involve 5,000 active military, causing institutional
destabilization. For us then it was important to decrease the
fear that the reopening of the trials was going to generate a
scenario of lack of governability… the information at that
moment was part of the debate of the establishment of the
trials policy agenda.33
The first use of information was to enable trials to move
forward, or, as Abramovich says, “in order to be able to open up for
Author interview with Víctor Abramovich, former executive director of CELS
(2001-2005), 10 February 2014.
33
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debate whether or not to prosecute with certain information.”34 CELS’
goal at this stage was to promote debate on the legitimacy of trialreopening by centering the discussion on what impact they would
have, how many trials there would be, how much time the prosecution
would require, and who would be investigated. This information came
from the judiciary, the institution in charge of carrying out the
prosecution, and it was not easily accessible to HROs, which at this
stage had few allies in the judicial branch.35 CELS had been fighting to
dismantle the amnesty in legal venues, and appeared to be the bestpositioned organization for the job. The differences from the
production of information during the transition were evident. As
Carolina Varsky noted, “Data had to reflect how many people could
be on trial, not how many people were responsible for State Terrorism.
This information could only be obtained by an organization working
in the courts.”36
CELS then began to compile information about the trials in
which it acted as plaintiff.37 Natalia Federman, at that time a CELS
lawyer, was in charge of keeping this record. She pointed out the
complexity of accessing information and the technological problems
faced.38 The first registry was an Excel spreadsheet, a sample of which
is presented in Figure 1. In it were listed the names of the accused, the
Ibid.
Offences against human rights are dealt with in the federal justice system, which
oversees major and complex crimes. Cases may be heard at four levels: first instance
courts, appeal courts (FCAs), a “Court of Cassation” (an intermediate review body,
only for criminal cases, that provides a second level of appeal convictions or
acquittals), and the Supreme Court, which is the definitive instance. The charges
brought are those specified in the Argentine criminal code, as in the Juntas trial.
36 Author interview with Carolina Varsky, former Litigation director of CELS, 12
February 2014.
37 During the post-transitional justice process, many HROs have acted as “plaintiff,”
a status the current Criminal Procedural Code (sanctioned in 1991) assigns to
accusations made by individuals or private organizations. This was not available
during the transition period.
38 Author interview with Natalia Federman, former CELS’ lawyer, 10 February 2014.
34
35
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cases in which they were involved, and the status of the legal
proceedings. The information was then matched up with data collected
in previous years such as the branch of the armed forces or unit of the
security services to which the accused belonged; the clandestine
detention center where they acted; as well as their nicknames, military
ranks, and other items that HROs had systematized during the
transition.
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Figure 1: Excel Spreadsheet with Information about the Accused and
the Status of Legal Proceedings (CELS Information, 2003)39

Columns refer to (from left to right): Last name, name, legal status, case 1 to 5.
Source: Natalia Federman.
39
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Information as Standard Setting (2007-2008)
This information strengthened the transitional justice process. At the
beginning of 2007, the three branches of government generally
supported criminal prosecution. Cases were soon active throughout
the country. However, there was a lack of reliable official information
with respect to case policy.40
The concern was no longer “how many?” but rather “how?”
In other words, the emphasis shifted to the quality of the trials. CELS’
interest was not only the trials’ mere existence, but also whether they
complied with certain prosecution standards. In particular, CELS was
concerned with the amount of time the judiciary was taking to
investigate the cases. In light of this, CELS began work on a statistical
methodology to monitor the concrete problems of the trials and to
propose a set of standards for their judgment, and design legal public
policy strategies.41
In this “second moment” of CELS trial monitoring work, the
first need was to design a national record. Through a network of
contacts, CELS managed to gather information on trials from all over
the country. Then, a set of three databases was created to measure the
development of the trials, ranging from the progress of each
investigation to the changes in the procedural status of the accused.42
Each one of these databases has its own criteria for selection and
loading of information, as well as specific variables:
·

Database of defendants: it gathers information on those people
who are presumed to have committed human rights violations

Cath Collins, Lorena Balardini, and Jo-Marie Burt, “Mapping Perpetrator
Prosecutions in Latin America,” The International Journal for Transitional Justice 7:1
(2013): 8-28.
41 CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2012,” (Buenos Aires:
Siglo XXI Editores, 2012): 53-54.
42 The information in the databases is based on the CELS working paper “Manual
for the statistical records of active cases and those accused for crimes against
humanity in Argentina,” drafted in March 2008 and updated in August 2011.
40
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·
·

during the last dictatorship and are being investigated in a
criminal case. They can be either members of the armed forces
or security services that existed at the moment of the events or
civilians.
Database of active cases: it records all the active criminal cases
for dictatorship-era human rights crimes in the country.
Database of people convicted: this includes details about the
convictions (prison sentences, crimes charged, and type of
responsibility of each defendant in them).

Each of these databases was designed to measure the trials’
outcomes, i.e. how many cases in which procedural status; how long
were the proceedings taking by province; etc. The design of the
variables and the monitoring system was based on the Criminal
Procedural Code, which establishes different stages of investigation,
and estimates times for each stage. Figure 2 provides an example of
the information collected for these purposes.
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Figure 2: Defendants’ Procedural Status (Argentina, December
2007)43
Categories are those of the criminal process: convicted, prosecuted (with or
without pre-trial detention), fugitives, lack of probable cause, and reported, among
43
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Information to Identify Gaps and Advocate for Change (2009-Present)
This led to a third moment regarding trials’ information. It was aimed
at investigating the gaps in the judicial institutional framework for
trying these types of complex cases and advocating for change.
The criminal process model experienced difficulties in adapting
to the investigation of systematic human rights violations. Data began
to show significant delays in the carrying out of trials. During 2006 and
2007, only two trials per year took place, in which 14 accused were
convicted. However, in the same period, over 200 open cases and more
than 700 accused were recorded. At this trial pace, it would be
impossible to carry out trials within a reasonable time.44
This problem was not entirely due to court delays. The
organization of the trials in several jurisdictions initially involved a
small number of victims and accused. CELS used the term “trickledown prosecution” to describe situations in which each complaint of
a victim was equivalent to one legal case against one or two defendants
without seeking common patterns among them. 45 This form of
organization was a result of the structure of the federal judiciary and
the usual criminal investigation. However, it multiplied cases (as
opposed to the Juntas trial, which implied the formation of a centralized
case structure thereby providing enormous capacity to concentrate
information). In the post-transition period, courts and prosecutors in
each jurisdiction were in charge of receiving requests for investigation
and re-opening cases, which produced dispersion and made
reconstruction difficult. This initial form of fragmented investigation

others. At that time, no defendants had been acquitted. See more statistics examples
at www.cels.org.ar/blogs/estadisticas/. Source: CELS 2008.
44 Ibid., 55-56.
45 CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2008 and 2009,” (Buenos
Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2009).
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led to an inefficient use of judicial resources and did not take into
account the systematic nature of the crimes.46
In this complicated scenario, information was used to influence
the state and promote improvements in the process. The Argentine
government and the judiciary had not made the decision to carry out a
strategic plan of prosecution or of monitoring the trials’ outcomes.
This is why CELS presented a series of requests to the three branches
of government that included the creation of agencies that would be
responsible for public policies related to the criminal prosecution of
dictatorship-era crimes. Among the functions or tasks that they should
have was the production of official information about the progress of
trials that would complement the monitoring carried out by CELS.
The proposed state agencies were the Unit for Coordinating
and Monitoring Cases for Human Rights Violations Committed under
State Terrorism, at the Attorney General’s Office (hereinafter
Coordination Unit); a “Truth and Justice” program reporting directly
to the executive branch, supposedly to implement a nationwide
Witness Protection Program and carry out risk assessments of each
trial; and a special unit of the Supreme Court,47 which was set up to
improve the transparency of the process by communicating trial
outcomes.48
Of those institutions, the one that took the prerogative to
produce information was the Coordination Unit. Since its creation, this
agency has developed a registry of those accused in cases for these
crimes, and has developed organizational strategies on the trials
throughout the country. As Alberto Saavedra, a member of the Unit,
notes:
CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2012,” (Buenos Aires:
Siglo XXI Editores, 2012): 57.
47 See www.cij.gov.ar.
48 See “Action lines to strengthen the process of seeking truth and justice,” CELS,
2007. Available from
http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/actionlines.pdf
46
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The Unit has become a reference; it is a centralized
point for the information. In this sense, I believe we
have responded to a need, that was to simplify access
to information… I believe that, in these cases, that are
highly sensitive and have a large social impact, society
had the possibility to control the actors and their
performance with respect to the cases.49
The institutional framework was complete in 2009, when an
inter-branch commission, comprising representatives of the executive,
the legislature, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office was created. It was
an effort to strengthen links between state bodies working on the trials.
However, some believe it did not produce a clearly positive impact on
the trials.50
These efforts culminated in the Court of Cassation’s
establishment of a set of practical rules to accelerate trials, prevent
unnecessary delays, and regulate the production of evidence,
particularly witness treatment in February 2012.51 These rules have had
some interesting effects on the trials. For instance, the amount of time
taken to read the accusations was reduced by almost two–thirds. In
addition, video-conferencing was admitted as a valid way of hearing
testimonies from witnesses who live abroad. Also, some special
procedures were implemented so that victims and perpetrators would
not have to share court facilities. At the same time, defendants usually
presented claims against the rules, which typically delayed court
Author interview with Alberto Saavedra, member of the Coordination Unit, now
named as Crimes Against Humanity Prosecutorial Unit, 12 February 2014.
50 Author interview with Pablo Parenti, former coordinator of the Coordination
Unit, 23 November 2012. Parenti argues that it was actually a space for debate but
that it was very hermetic (it was hard for non-state actors to bring their demands)
and that it was very difficult to schedule meetings regularly in order to have sustained
and regular discussions.
51 Resolution 1/12 of the Court of Cassation, March 2012.
49
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procedures. Nevertheless, judges have consistently denied these claims
and confirmed the constitutionality of the rules.52
Remaining Challenges
Notwithstanding these advances, the information arena was, and
continues to be, a field of dispute among the actors involved. An
interesting aspect of this is the resistance to the production of
information from an internal legal culture perspective of the legal
field. 53 This includes the complexity of incorporating routines of
systematization and information production into the everyday-work of
the courts.
When the Coordination Unit was created, the Attorney
General obliged federal prosecutors to report the progress of all cases
in their jurisdiction on a monthly basis. According to Pablo Parenti,
who was appointed as coordinator of the Unit, an Excel sheet was
attached to this resolution with specific “fields”: province, court, case
number, prosecutor involved, subject of the case, and status of
proceedings. However, Parenti mentioned that this did not imply the
development of a methodology, information routine, or any training
experience: “All of this was done in a very home-made fashion: a few
people that worked in the prosecutor’s offices did it without any help
from any IT or statistics professional.”54 For Parenti, in addition to the
methodological problems, the biggest challenge was to incorporate the
information tasks into the various judicial offices:

Author interviews with Carolina Varsky and Pablo Parenti.
Laurence Friedman and Rogelio Pérez Perdomo define legal culture as the “group
of attitudes, ideas, expectations and values of people about their legal system.” There
is an internal and an external legal culture; the former relating to the norms and
practices of legal officers, lawyers and jurists. See Laurence Friedman and Rogelio
Pérez Perdomo, Legal Culture in the Age of Globalization: Latin America and Latin Europe
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 2.
54 Interview with Pablo Parenti.
52
53
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We had to get the prosecutors to comply with producing
reports, something that is not within common judicial practice.
When one asks for this type of information, what is in play is
not only that you are creating additional work for an office, but
also we are asking them for a tool that, afterwards, is useful for
controlling their work: I think this was the most sensitive part.55
On the other hand, those interviewed expressed frustration
that the bureaucratic structure of the Attorney General’s Office
prevented incorporating the necessary methodologies for the
systematization task, which was an obstacle for the work. In the Unit,
multiple Excel spreadsheets were used at least up to December 2014,
thereby complicating the possibility of statistical analysis and reducing
the efficiency of information production. As Saavedra notes, “We have
a frankly very defective tool. What we ended up doing was to print and
paste the pages into a long sausage [sic] and we shouted out the
names…. We have not been able to overcome this, despite having
made various attempts.”56
Another important aspect was the lack of cooperation between
the actors involved in the production of information about the trials.
If the Coordination Unit had access to privileged and reliable
information, and CELS had certain methodological innovations, closer
collaboration between the two would have been advisable. Although
this happened in the first couple of years after the creation of the Unit,
later on it ceased. In the words of Carolina Varsky, there was a type of
“inexplicable underhanded competition.”57
In addition, available data do not allow for measuring the
universe of victims whose cases are being investigated in the
framework of these trials. Up to December 2015, there is no official
or unofficial data on how many cases of victims have been prosecuted,
Ibid.
Interview with Alberto Saavedra.
57 Interview with Carolina Varsky.
55
56
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how many have had a judgment, conviction, or acquittal, how many
of those cases are victims recognized in CONADEP’s records, or how
many cases of state-recognized victims have not been criminally
investigated yet. This lack of data prevents the actors involved in trialmonitoring from designing a clear indicator of effective access to
justice for the victims.
Finally, an issue that needs further analysis is the slow-down
in the pace of trial proceedings during 2015. There are many trials that
have been active for the past three years, such as the mega cases called
“ESMA unificada” and “Operation Condor” in Buenos Aires and “La
Perla” in Córdoba. However, the number of hearings per week as well
as the duration of each hearing has fallen significantly. Some actors
involved in the trials argue the justice process is beginning to show a
kind of “exhaustion” after ten years of criminal prosecution,58 while
others believe the changes in broader politics may be influencing the
judges’ behavior (i.e. the presidential campaign and recent change of
government).59 It remains to be seen how persistent this trend will be.
Conclusion
This note from the field is part of a more extensive research project
that intends to build knowledge on the problems that arise when trying
to systematically measure gross human rights violations during
transitions. Measurement systems seem to offer a clear opportunity to
build the facts and to support transitional justice mechanisms. All
policy decisions relating to human rights violations usually derive from
data: defining, identifying, and counting victims and perpetrators and
clarifying which facts constitute crimes are the baseline to measure the
phenomenon.
Information has been a key element in HROs’ efforts to
influence public policies locally, to seek international support, and to
Ibid.
Author interview with Ana Oberlin, former Legal Director of the National
Human Rights Secretary (2011-2015), 17 September 2015.
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achieve accountability. However, information strategies also are
shaped by debates and disputes among stakeholders as to who
measures, why, and how. Overall, there are serious shortcomings in
the techniques and methodologies implemented, particularly by state
agencies.
During the post-transition period, the return of criminal
prosecution has taken center stage. Regarding information politics, this
process is the heir to the strategies implemented during the transition.
At least in its beginning, the information used to put together the cases
is the one designed at that time. However, the challenge for the
production of information in this stage will not be the search for
patterns or the building of cases. Rather, as the justice process extends
over time (contrary to the abrupt end to criminal proceedings during
the transition), the information has to be able to reflect the “treatment” that the
justice system gives to the case, and its effects on legal accountability. This way, the
information during the post-transition phase not only contributes to
continuing to file cases in the courts, but also raises questions about
the justice system’s handling of these cases. Information also provides
tools to legal professionals, within the framework of the internal legal
culture, to monitor judicial practices that enable the definition of legal
strategies.
The key variable explaining why some HROs continued to
provide a strong documentary focus of research and systematization
while others gradually abandoned it is professionalization. Its effects are
determinant in understanding how CELS was able to persist in its task
of systematization, by using it as the basis for its accountability
struggle. The production of information is a key advocacy element and
it is clearly affected by professionalization: it implied gradually losing
the “artisanal” component and giving space to information
technologies. This is the framework in which CELS databases are
developed. Of course, they were implemented in several ways, which
cannot be fully reconstructed here. Nevertheless, their most visible
and, until now, most influential aspect has been the possibility of
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monitoring judicial actors, identifying the deficiencies and obstacles of
trial proceedings, and using data to formulate public policies for trialprogress. Another important effect of this information production was
the publicity of the proceedings, as it stimulated journalistic coverage
of the cases. Trial information is currently “used” not only by
journalists, but by anyone interested in Argentina’s criminal justice
process.
This case also reveals the tensions between the state and civil
society. Information production has been one of the state’s weaknesses
regarding its strategic planning and methodology. The information
production experience of the Coordination Unit in the Attorney
General’s Office has not been explored much by academic literature,
as it deals with a process that is still ongoing. From what was analyzed
by this research, there appears to be some tension between the
demands of civil society and the Unit. The clearest source of tension
is that, while both took up trial monitoring, CELS did so in order to
have a tool for controlling and monitoring state’s actions, while the
Unit sought to be the official producer of information on the subject.
Friction emerged because the two were engaged in competition instead
of cooperation. There are clear benefits to having the Attorney
General’s Office—which is independent of the three branches of the
government—monitor and evaluate the justice process. But it
continues to be worrisome that the state’s bureaucratic mindset
prevents it from operating as effectively as civil society, despite facing
far fewer obstacles. This way, privileged access to the information,
such as a state institution has, is not a real advantage since there is no
efficient methodology implemented.
Furthermore, information production during the posttransition period has helped to identify problematic aspects of the
administration of justice, i.e. the organization of cases, the
optimization of the proceeding times, and the need to create agencies
or designate new judges and prosecutors to conduct the trials. Many
of the organizational problems still remain after almost ten years of
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sustained trials. As of December 2015, there are more than 500 active
cases still awaiting trial throughout the country while the process’
rhythm begins to slow down.60
To conclude, there remains a large gap between the amount of
information produced and the number of victims whose cases have
been taken to the courts in the post-transition period. These aspects
are related to a general problem of victim’s records in Argentina.
Nearly 9,000 disappearances were recorded by CONADEP, and other
state agencies have made adjustments and added new data since. 61
However, the state has not cross-referenced different records in order
to obtain an official reliable figure of the number of victims. This
aspect of the information is the clearest weakness in terms of
systemization of information related to the phenomenon of grave
human rights violations and its treatment by the truth and justice
mechanisms in the framework of the accountability processes.

According to information from the Prosecutorial Unit for Crimes Against
Humanity available from http://www.fiscales.gob.ar/lesa-humanidad/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2015/06/20150612-Informe-Procuradur%C3%ADa-deCr%C3%ADmenes-contra-la-Humanidad.pdf
61 On 11 December 2015 the Unified Registry of state terrorism’s victims published
a report on the official recognized victims. They acknowledge 7,018 victims of
enforced disappearance and 1,613 victims of homicide: 8,631 victims in total.
However, the report does not explain the adjustments made to CONADEP’s data,
and states that there are another 3,000 victims of kidnapping and torture not
considered in the figures, and thus they believe this number to be “incomplete.” They
clarify that there are other records (such as the reparations’ one and information
from the trials) that they have not considered and that is the reason they are leaving
this important amount of cases out. This needs further and deeper study, but a first
assessment shows it is not very reliable data. The report is available at
http://www.jus.gob.ar/derechoshumanos/areas-tematicas/ruvte.aspx.
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